时间：2019年4月13日（周六）上午9:30-11:30
地点：文泉北403会议室
主办单位：威尼斯wns.8885556
主讲人简介：黄炜博士是新加坡国立大学President’s Assistant Professor。在加入新加坡国立大学之前，黄博士是NBER老龄化与健康经济学博士后研究员。黄博士于2016年获得哈佛大学经济学博士学位。他的研究领域包括公共经济学、劳动经济学和卫生经济学。他对健康、教育、种族和中国等话题感兴趣。他的研究成果发表在Review of Economic and Statistics, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Nature, Journal of Economic Perspectives, etc. 他同时担任Economics of Transition杂志的编辑。
讲座题目I：Too Busy to Be Cured？
摘要：Monetary cost is emphasized in health economics literature but time cost is largely ignored. This paper investigates how time cost affects the healthcare usage in both China and the US. Using the retirement age policy in both countries, I employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and find that the level of hospitalization persistently increases after retirement age. Specifically, a 10 percentage points lower employment is significantly associated with 1.6-3.8 percentage points higher in hospitalization. In addition, the effects are significant among high education people but not in low education group. Finally, eligible people do more physical exercise and have higher healthcare expenditure after retirement age. These results provide a more comprehensive picture of moral hazard and add up to the growing literature about retirement and time use in economics.
讲座题目II：Unawareness of Unhealthiness, Information Provision, and Health Insurance Participation among the Elderly
摘要：People may be unaware of their unhealthiness and thus make suboptimal decisions in insurance participation. Using national representative samples of the elderly in US and China, we find that the unawareness of unhealthiness is significantly associated withlower socio-economic status, poorer health, and less insurance participation. We further find that accurate health information provided through physical examinations induces relatively higher participation afterwards suggesting information as an important mechanism. These findings contribute a new explanation for the insufficient participation among poor people and advantageous selection in health insurance. (JEL codes: I12, I13, J14)